The New York Times : Θετική η οικονομική πορεία της Αργεντινής

Horacio Paone for The New York Times

 Horacio Paone

January 28, 2013

Στο άρθρο που παρατίθεται πιο κάτω, ανλύεται η  θετική οικονομική πορεία της Αργεντινής με την έγκυρη υπογραφή των New York Times. Από το άρθρο προκύπτει ότι,  η κατάσταση σήμερα είναι πολύ καλύτερη απο ότι ήταν πριν όταν το αργεντίνικο πέσος ήταν συνδεδεμένο με το σκληρό αμερικάνικο δολάριο. Η οικονομική πολιτική της Κριστίνας Κίρτσνερ  στηρίζεται στο κατάλληλα υποτιμημένο εθνικό της νόμισμα, αλλά και σε ένα ευρύτερο σύστημα ελέγχων των εισαγωγών και των εξαγωγών με θετικότατα αποτελέσματα, όπως διαφαίνεται απο τη μεγάλη αύξηση του ΑΕΠ, της βιομηχανικής δραστηριότητας και τη μείωση της ανεργίας. Στα πλάισια αυτής της σύγχρονης επεκτατικής Κευνσιανής πολιτικής, ο υπάρχων πληθωρισμός της τάξης του 10-20%, τον οποίο καταδικάζουν μονολιθικά οι μονεταριστές, αποτελεί ελάσσων πρόβλημα στην πραγματικότητα. Κατά μία άποψη, ένας τέτοιος ελεγχόμενος πληθωρισμός, μπορεί και να λειτουργεί  ευεργετικά σπρώχνοντας προς τα επάνω όλη την οικονομία. Και αυτό, με την προυπόθεση ότι το κράτος αποφεύγει τις σπατάλες και αντιστέκεται  στην υπέρμετρη παροχολογία που δημιουργεί πολλαπλασιαστικές πληθωριστικές προσδοκίες και καταστάσεις. Στο τέλος του άρθρου των New York Times, παραθέτουμε και την πρόσφατη έκθεση της CIA για την οικονομία της Αργεντινής, όπου επίσης, αναδεικνύεται η γενικότερα θετική πορεία της χώρας τα τελευταία χρόνια, σε πείσμα των απίθανων περι του αντιθέτου ψευδολογιών που διαδίδουν τα εδώ επαίσχυντα καθεστωτικά μέσα μαζικής αποχάυνωαης.  

Argentina rebounded from its economic crisis of 2001 with steady economic growth, disrupted only briefly by the global slowdown triggered by the financial crisis of 2008.

In 2010, the economy grew by 9.2 percent, the fastest in Latin America. And as its economy recovered, so did the political prospects of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was re-elected by a wide margin in October 2011.

Mrs. Kirchner, who succeeded her husband, Néstor Kirchner, in 2007 to become the country’s first female president, made a remarkable comeback. By 2009, her combative style, highlighted by a heated dispute over agricultural export taxes, sent her approval ratings below 30 percent, and economists predicted doom for the subsidy-heavy economic model first orchestrated by Mr. Kirchner.

By the time of her re-election campaign, by many measures Argentina was booming: the economy was expected to grow by 8 percent in 2011, the fastest growth in Latin America; employment had reached record levels; and the poverty rate had been cut by more than half since 2007, the government said. The country continues to benefit from heavy government spending, high commodity prices and strong demand from China for its agricultural products.

Still, in re-electing Mrs. Kirchner, voters seemed willing to look past some troubling signs. Inflation soared to over 20 percent in 2011,  second only to Venezuela’s among major Latin American economies, economists said. And the government has continued to govern with a heavy hand and little tolerance for opponents, including among the news media.

Opposition candidates tried to seize on those issues but gained little atraction with voters.

Nationalizing the Nation’s Largest Oil Company

In April 2012, Mrs. Kirchner announced that the government would seize a majority stake in YPF, the nation’s largest oilcompany.

The expropriation would reassert state control over an important pillar of Argentina’s economy, but it has increased diplomatic tensions with Spain and the European Union.

Under Mrs. Kirchner’s plan, which she announced on national television, Argentina’s government would take a 51 percent controlling stake in YPF, which is now majority-owned by a Spanish energy company, Repsol YPF. Of that new stake, Argentina’s central government would get 51 percent and the country’s provinces 49 percent. The plan is part of a bill submitted to Argentina’s Congress that is widely expected to be approved.

The Spanish government repeated its earlier pledge to retaliate, though it did not specify how. Following an emergency cabinet meeting in Madrid on Monday evening, José Manuel García Margallo, the Spanish foreign minister, said that Madrid “condemned with the utmost energy” Argentina’s move. The European Union also criticized the plan.

Repsol owns 57 percent of YPF and said Monday that it would study “all legal options available”  to defend its interests and those of shareholders against a forced sale. It was not immediately clear how YPF’s shareholders would be affected by the takeover. A tribunal would determine how much compensation that Repsol and other shareholders would receive for their YPF shares.

Mrs. Kirchner said that the expropriation of YPF, a company founded by Argentina’s government in the 1920s and privatized in the 1990s, was a “recovery of sovereignty and control.” She said the move would allow Argentina to raise production, after the country had recently become an energy importer.

For months, the central government and provincial officials had pressured YPF to raise its investments in Argentine production. The government’s tactics had included revoking concessions for coveted fields.

Seizing YPF appears to be a popular move in Argentina, where caps on residential energy prices and a growing economy have helped push energy demand to new highs. And many Argentines still resent the privatization of state-owned companies in the 1990s, so taking on YPF gives Mrs. Kirchner the opportunity to go after a symbol of that time.

Mrs. Kirchner had already nationalized Argentine Airlines and pension funds, while also pressuring companies in Argentina to repatriate export proceeds in an effort to slow capital flight. Seizing control of YPF sent a new signal about Argentina’s policies toward foreign investment, especially in the energy sector.

Background

During the 1990s, seeking to tame hyperinflation, Argentina had tied the value of its peso to the American dollar — a “convertibility” strategy that proved unsustainable because of rising global interest rates. The country privatized many industries, which led to high unemployment but also made Argentina’s economy more efficient.

By 1999, however, it was clear to most economists that Argentina was marching inexorably toward a default and devaluation. The number of people under the poverty line was growing — it peaked at more than 50 percent of the population in 2002 — and unemployment was soaring.

Social tensions rose. There were eight general strikes in Argentina in 2001, with looting and thousands of roadblocks. Huge lines formed outside many European embassies as waves of Argentines fled their country.

In December, the government fell, and the departing president fled as a riot raged below. Over the next 10 days, four presidents assumed power and then quickly resigned before a fifth, Eduardo Duhalde, declared the currency devaluation. A short time later, Congress formally approved the debt default that was already a de facto reality.

In 2003, Mr. Kirchner was elected to succeed the interim president, Mr. Duhalde. Mr. Kirchner embarked on a new economic model — the one that his wife continued to follow. Its pillars are sustaining a weak currency to foster exports and discourage imports, and maintaining fiscal and trade surpluses that can be tapped for financing government and paying down debt.

The Argentine government waited until 2005, when its economy was already in recovery, to conduct the first of two debt restructurings. Nongovernment foreign investors — the biggest included pension funds from Italy, Japan and the United States — took haircuts costing them two-thirds of their investments.

Notably, the one creditor that was paid back in full — in 2006 — was the International Monetary Fund, to which Argentina owed $9.8 billion dating to the 1990s.

Since paying off the International Monetary Fund, Argentina has not borrowed from the fund. That enabled the Kirchner governments to avoid the agency’s typical prescription of cutting state spending.

The Argentine government has maintained hefty subsidies on energy and some food to avoid public discontent — steps that would be anathema to the monetary fund. But high commodity prices have helped let Mrs. Kirchner maintain popularity at home through generous government outlay

Argentina Economy 2012  http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/argentina/argentina_economy.html  SOURCE: 2012 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK AND OTHER SOURCES
Economy - overview Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly literate population, an export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. Although one of the world's wealthiest countries 100 years ago, Argentina suffered during most of the 20th century from recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt, and capital flight. A severe depression, growing public and external indebtedness, and a bank run culminated in 2001 in the most serious economic, social, and political crisis in the country's turbulent history. Interim President Adolfo RODRIGUEZ SAA declared a default - the largest in history - on the government's foreign debt in December of that year, and abruptly resigned only a few days after taking office. His successor, Eduardo DUHALDE, announced an end to the peso's decade-long 1-to-1 peg to the US dollar in early 2002. The economy bottomed out that year, with real GDP 18% smaller than in 1998 and almost 60% of Argentines under the poverty line. Real GDP rebounded to grow by an average 8.5% annually over the subsequent six years, taking advantage of previously idled industrial capacity and labor, an audacious debt restructuring and reduced debt burden, excellent international financial conditions, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Inflation also increased, however, during the administration of President Nestor KIRCHNER, which responded with price restraints on businesses, as well as export taxes and restraints, and beginning in early 2007, with understating inflation data. Cristina FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER succeeded her husband as President in late 2007, and the rapid economic growth of previous years began to slow sharply the following year as government policies held back exports and the world economy fell into recession. The economy has rebounded strongly from the 2009 recession, but the government's continued reliance on expansionary fiscal and monetary policies risks exacerbating already high inflation. GDP (purchasing power parity) $709.7 billion (2011 est.)  $657.2 billion (2010 est.)  $602 billion (2009 est.)  note: data are in 2011 US dollars GDP (official exchange rate) $435.2 billion (2011 est.) GDP - real growth rate 8% (2011 est.)  9.2% (2010 est.)  0.8% (2009 est.) GDP - per capita (PPP) $17,400 (2011 est.)  $16,200 (2010 est.)  $15,000 (2009 est.)  note: data are in 2011 US dollars GDP - composition by sector agriculture: 10%  industry: 30.7%  services: 59.2% (2011 est.) Population below poverty line 30%  note: data are based on private estimates (2010) Labor force 16.76 million  note: urban areas only (2011 est.) Labor force - by occupation agriculture: 5%  industry: 23%  services: 72% (2009 est.) Unemployment rate 7.2% (2011 est.)  7.8% (2010 est.) Unemployment, youth ages 15-24 total: 21.2%  male: 18.8%  female: 24.7% (2009) Household income or consumption by percentage share lowest 10%: 1.7%  highest 10%: 29.5% (3rd Quarter, 2010) Distribution of family income - Gini index 45.8 (2009) Investment (gross fixed) 22.6% of GDP (2011 est.) Budget revenues: $105.8 billion  expenditures: $113.3 billion (2011 est.) Taxes and other revenues 25.1% of GDP (2011 est.) Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-) -2% of GDP (2011 est.) Public debt 42.9% of GDP (2011 est.)  45.1% of GDP (2010 est.) Inflation rate (consumer prices) 22% (2010 est.)  16% (2009 est.)  note: data are derived from private estimates Central bank discount rate NA% Commercial bank prime lending rate 11.8% (31 December 2011 est.)  10.558% (31 December 2010 est.) Stock of money $32.57 billion (31 December 2008)  $33.93 billion (31 December 2007) Stock of narrow money $52.63 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $56.32 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Stock of quasi money $46.18 billion (31 December 2008)  $45.92 billion (31 December 2007) Stock of broad money $132.3 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $112.9 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Stock of domestic credit $136.4 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $104.9 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Market value of publicly traded shares $63.91 billion (31 December 2010)  $48.93 billion (31 December 2009)  $52.31 billion (31 December 2008) Agriculture - products sunflower seeds, lemons, soybeans, grapes, corn, tobacco, peanuts, tea, wheat; livestock Industries food processing, motor vehicles, consumer durables, textiles, chemicals and petrochemicals, printing, metallurgy, steel Industrial production growth rate 6.5%  note: based on private estimates (2011 est.) Electricity - production 115.4 billion kWh (2008 est.) Electricity - production by source fossil fuel: 52.2%  hydro: 40.8%  nuclear: 6.7%  other: 0.2% (2001) Electricity - consumption 104.7 billion kWh (2008 est.) Electricity - exports 3 billion kWh (2009 est.) Electricity - imports 5.53 billion kWh (2009 est.) Oil - production 763,600 bbl/day (2010 est.) Oil - consumption 618,000 bbl/day (2010 est.) Oil - exports 238,100 bbl/day (2009 est.) Oil - imports 19,380 bbl/day (2009 est.) Oil - proved reserves 2.505 billion bbl (1 January 2011 est.) Natural gas - production 40.1 billion cu m (2010 est.) Natural gas - consumption 43.46 billion cu m (2010 est.) Natural gas - exports 880 million cu m (2009 est.) Natural gas - imports 3.78 billion cu m (2010 est.) Natural gas - proved reserves 378.8 billion cu m (1 January 2011 est.) Current Account Balance -$264.1 million (2011 est.)  $3.081 billion (2010 est.) Exports $83.71 billion (2011 est.)  $68.13 billion (2010 est.) Exports - commodities soybeans and derivatives, petroleum and gas, vehicles, corn, wheat Exports - partners Brazil 21.2%, China 9.1%, Chile 7%, US 5.4% (2009) Imports $71.73 billion (2011 est.)  $53.87 billion (2010 est.) Imports - commodities machinery, motor vehicles, petroleum and natural gas, organic chemicals, plastics Imports - partners Brazil 34.5%, US 13.8%, China 11.4%, Germany 5% (2009) Reserves of foreign exchange and gold $53.35 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $52.23 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Debt - external $136 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $128 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Stock of direct foreign investment - at home $93.35 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $86.35 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad $31.49 billion (31 December 2011 est.)  $30.39 billion (31 December 2010 est.) Exchange rates Argentine pesos (ARS) per US dollar -  4.132 (2011 est.)  3.8963 (2010 est.)  3.7101 (2009)  3.1636 (2008)  3.1105 (2007) Fiscal year calendar yea

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